Journal Review by Kenny Bellew
Rhetorical Theory with Anne Aronson
Master of Science in Technical Communication
Journal 2 of 5: Giambattista Vico
February 2008
Part I: Key Ideas of Pages 74 - End
In this section, Vico continues to
make a case for language being the source of invention that verifies truth. He
praises the Greek language for its ability to articulate extraordinary ideas
and the finer points of difficult-to-understand concepts. Vico points out that
this power of language allowed the Hellenes to develop a superior political
constitution that was the envy of other nations. However, he incorrectly claims
that
Vico adduces the greater need for
universities during his time compared to the Greek or Roman time periods. He
asserts that students must learn the history of the Greeks, the Romans and the
Lombards (who invaded
This is especially interesting to
me, as I have spent considerable time studying pseudepigrapha, interpolations
in historical writings, especially as it pertains to religious histories,
hagiographies and the shaping of theological ideas. The fact that pseudepigrapha
was in such vogue in the first five centuries must give any student pause in a
quest for historical truth. Because Vico believed that history was one of the
ingredients needed in his recipe of truth, a proper view of the past was
essential for a true understanding of the present.
These types of difficulties are why
Vico proclaims universities are needed more during his time than previously.
However, in the same breath, he bemoans the disjointed nature of education in
the universities and longs for the simpler times of Socrates. In the
universities of his day, the student was taught many different subjects by
teachers of differing philosophical views. Vico points out several fields of
study: discourse was taught by an Aristotelian, physics by an atomist like an
Epicurean and metaphysics by a Cartesian (follower of René Descartes). It is
the latter mention that is most interesting.
While as much as fifteen centuries
separate the ideas of Aristotle and Epicurus from Vico, only one century
separates the conflicting teachings of Vico and René Descartes. It seems to me
that most academic references to a "Cartesian" usually refer to René
Descartes' system of mathematic coordinates. However, Vico links the
"Cartesian" to metaphysics. Vico goes on to list Galen, a famous 1st
century teaching-surgeon and Accursius, a thirteenth-century legal
scholar. Vico's suggestion is that the
university professors should consolidate and harmonize the ideologies to make education
a more coherent body of learning. However, by targeting the science of René
Descartes, it seems to me that Vico is attempting to indirectly elevate his new
science as the solution for blending and smoothing heterogeneous ideas.
Herrick mentions that René Descartes
despised rhetoric and wished to see it relegated to an obscure corner of the
university [Herrick, p.176]. In essence, Vico is defending his craft from such
thinking, aggrandizing its superior nature and showing how it can be used to
replace the chaos of the current system.
Vico appeals to the example of
Francis Bacon (1561 - 1626), who advised King James of England that "young
scholars should not be admitted to the study of eloquence unless they had
previously studied their way through the whole curriculum of learning"
[Vico, p.78]. Vico seems to be building a case that his brand of rhetoric is so
deep and broad that it can be used as the foundation for all learning. After
which, he brags about his humility [Vico, p.79].
Part II: Selected Passage from Pages
12 - 20
Vico writes, "It is a positive
fact that, just as knowledge originates in truth and error in falsity, so
common sense arises from perceptions based on verisimilitude. Probabilities
stand, so to speak, midway between truth and falsity, since things which most
of the time are true, are only very seldom false" [Vico, p.13].
Vico is saying that we create truth
through our understanding of probabilities. We only articulate probabilities
through use of our imagination, which is populated from our history. Common
sense arises from the collection of the probabilities we understand to be true.
This collection of probabilities is the well from which invention draws. Herrick
mentions that Vico placed importance on our innate capacity to grasp
similarities or relationships. Vico called this ingenium [Herrick, p.177]. It is from our understanding of the
relationship between probabilities that we invent truth. Vico's principle that
truth is verified by invention was called his verum factum principle (truth is fact). It contrasts with René
Descartes' idea of truth, which stated that truth came from empirical observation
versus being created. Descartes discarded probability because it contained a
measure of doubt. Vico saw this as a lack of practicality.
I especially find interesting Vico's
comment, “Probabilities stand, so to speak, midway between truth and
falsity." This is similar to
Aristotle's Golden Mean, where truth was found in the middle of two extremes [Nicomachean
Ethics, Book II]. Courage, for example, was found between cowardness and
recklessness. However, Vico overcomes the Golden Mean's shortcoming of not adequately
handling multifaceted problems by seeing truth as compound probabilities. It
provided the flexibility needed to sort out a complex issue.
Part III: Connections with Other
Descartes is famous for the phrase, "cogito ergo
sum" or “I think, therefore I am.”
To formulate his view of truth he felt he needed to discard everything
that could be doubted. After doing so, he was left with only his thoughts- only
things that could be conjured from his mind. This led him to place great
importance on truth which could be perceived regardless of things outside his
mind. He was a veritable genius at mathematics, which he saw as a perfect model
of truth. Math was true regardless of any event outside of his mind. Truth,
like math, was deductive knowledge. In this sense, he was a rationalist.
Herrick points out that Vico argued
that Descartes’ mathematical truths were as reliant on symbols as were the
orations of the rhetoricians [Herrick, p.176]. In other words, even Descartes
empiricism was rooted in subjective symbols. Similarly, Whitburn states, “The new
scientists (post-revolutionary) wanted words to approximate mathematical symbols.
Such symbols were to possess no virtue in themselves but stand for quantities
and relationships. Nothing was to exist between observation and description”
[Whitburn, p.125]. As hard as Descartes tried to be an absolutist, as hard as
he tried to keep his symbols pure, all knowledge and symbols become relative
once filtered through human interpretation.
One of the most influential
philosophers of science in the 20th century, Karl Popper (1902 –
1994) said, “Science never pursues the illusory aim of making its answers
final, or even probable. Its advance is, rather, towards the infinite yet
attainable aim of ever discovering new, deeper, and more general problems, and
of subjecting its ever tentative answers to ever renewed and ever more rigorous
tests” [Popper, p. 281].
What Vico realized that Descartes
missed is that the goal of science, the goal of empiricism, is not truth at
all. The goal is to realize what can be falsified. Science does not prove
something true. It proves which related elements and ideas can be falsified.
The item left standing garners respect until someone can falsify it, but
science never makes claim to absolute truth. If it did, the beauty of discovery
would wither and die.
References:
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, trans. Terence Irwin, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1999)
James Herrick, The History and Theory of Rhetoric. Allyn & Bacon, 3rd ed., (May 2004)
Donald Kagan, Aristotle's History of Athenian Democracy Classical Philology, Vol. 59, No. 3. (Jul., 1964) p. 190.
Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Basic Books, 1959) p. 281.
Merrill D. Whitburn, Landmark Essay: The Plain Style in Scientific and Technical Writing (1999) p.125.